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Abstract 
State interventions into Labour policies in India are directed towards ensuring both job 
security and income security. In this paper we look at likely impact of such policies. The laws 
are found to serve the organised workers primarily while large masses of unorganised 
workers are without any security. To escape legislations, employers have substituted labour 
by capital, hired casual workers, and set up ancillary units. Consequently, output elasticity of 
employment has consistently declined and there is marked casualisation of workforce. 
Legislations have thus institutionalised and perpetuated labour market dualism. Reforms 
herein are necessary but should be implemented in a careful and phased manner to avoid 
deteriorating conditions in both the sectors in the name of uniformity. Linking retrenchment 
with Area Regeneration Programmes; upgrading employability quotient through training; 
allowing employers to transfer workers between units; providing easy credit and technical 
consultancy; and cooperative formation would help the workers. 
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STATE INTERVENTION AND LABOUR MARKET IN INDIA: ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Interaction between State and Labour came into being as work became organised and some 
sort of regimentation of workforce started. Historically, laws and acts concerning labour 
originated to ensure regular and disciplined workforce to the modern sectors of production – 
mines, plantations and factories. This was done to ensure that wavering commitment of 
workers migrating from the traditional agricultural sector to these sectors does not create 
recurring shortages of labour and irregular production. As surplus rural workers came to 
perceive that the wages offered by these modern sectors were substantially higher than they 
were earning at home, transition of labourers became more permanent and regular. With 
abundant labour supply, the balance of power shifted towards the employers who now began 
to exploit the workers – by paying little, employing children and women who were paid even 
less, paying no attention to working or living conditions, operating 18 hour shifts, and 
offering no provision for leave of absence. This has been the experience worldwide – from 
the first industrial revolution in Britain to the newly industrialising economies of Asia and 
Africa. As a result, while the initial laws were pro-employer, laws in the later periods were 
pro-employee, enacted to prevent inhuman exploitation of the workers and offer them a 
dignified living. However, while the objectives of State intervention into matters related to 
Labour are justified and commendable, the effect of these interventions has not always been 
commensurate to their aims. In this paper we attempt to look at State policies towards Labour 
in India and the major impact of such policies on the labour market and the economy. 
II. LABOUR POLICIES IN INDIA – AN OVERVIEW 
There have been two basic tenets of labour policies in India related to the fields of (a) 
Employment security, and, (b) Minimum wages and other benefits. These laws have also 
moved through the same phases as discussed earlier. 
1. Employment Security 
The first piece of labour legislation, The Workmen’s Breach of Contract Act, 1859 was 
enacted to make any breach of contract by workers punishable by law as a crime. Though it 
was repealed in 1926 allowing trade unions to function, employment regulations till 1947 
(e.g. Trade Disputes Act, 1929; Rule 81-A of the Defence of India Rules, 1942) aimed to 
secure uninterrupted production, not employment security. In addition, predominance of 
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foreign owned enterprises meant that Indian workers were struggling against the colonial 
masters. 
After independence, labour laws were enacted to eradicate labour exploitation and to shift the 
balance of power from the employers to the workers. The other objective was to enhance the 
welfare of the workers in general so that they can live with dignity. This was expected to 
spread prosperity to a larger mass of people in the long run. Employment security was 
provided through regulations and State interventions, and market forces were substituted by 
forcing employers to ensure certain minimum standards. In cases of the contractual 
conditions being lower than the legal minima, the legal conditions would supersede the 
contractual agreements. The plethora of labour related laws in Independent India started with 
the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 that succeeded the Industrial Employment (Standing 
Orders) Act, 1946. This Act puts in black and white the rights and obligations of employees 
and employers related to almost every aspect of organised employment. The earlier law 
provided for settlement of disputes regarding termination, through compulsory adjudication 
by appropriate authority in absence of mutually satisfying agreement between employer and 
employee. There were no restrictions on retrenchment until 1976 if an employer followed 
reverse chronological order, gave a month's notice or pay in lieu of notice, paid half a month's 
average pay for every year of continuous service or any part in excess of six months and 
informed the government. For retrenchment following closure, the requirement of sixty days’ 
notice was introduced in 1972 but retrenchment remained the sole prerogative of the 
employer till 1976. Amendments to the Industrial Disputes Act in 1976 and 1982 placed 
severe restrictions on employers and required three months’ notice & prior permission from 
‘appropriate government’ for retrenchment or closure in industrial establishments employing 
100 or more workers. While these provisions were disputed in court, in 1984 these were 
reintroduced through an Amendment to the Constitution. Certification of service rules under 
the Industrial Employment (Standing Orders) Act, 1946 has been another source of 
employment security. Along with these, The Shops and Establishments Act, 1953 attempts to 
provide statutory obligation and rights to employees and employers in shops and 
establishments. 
2. Wages and Benefits 
State intervention in determining wages has also been quite substantial in India, and quite 
pervasive in the organised sector. The basic framework was set out in The Report of the 
Committee on Fair Wages, 1948 following which the government designed fairly elaborate 
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methods of intervention. For the organised sector, Tripartite Wage Boards were established to 
guarantee a decent minimum wage to the workers. For Central Public Sector Undertakings 
(CPSUs), there are periodic wage settlements by the Department of Public Enterprises and 
the state-level PSUs follows the Central PSUs. Rules related to indexation compensate 
workers for rising cost of living through Dearness Allowances. In addition, Payment of Bonus 
Act, 1965 provides statutory bonus. Workers and employees have automatic annual 
increments to basic wages and in some establishments receive welfare benefits and other 
allowances. The government has also attempted to limit wage inequality through the Indian 
Companies Act, 1956. The main instrument for ensuring minimum wages in the unorganised 
sector is the Minimum Wages Act, 1948, under which minimum wages for an eight-hour 
work-day has been fixed for certain types of jobs where the market conditions expose the 
workers to exploitation. 
To these were added The Factories Act, 1948 ensuring adequate safety measures, health and 
welfare of the factory workers; The Employees State Insurance Act, 1948 providing health 
cover, medical care and cash benefits for sickness, etc.; The Employees Provident Funds and 
Misc. Provisions Act, 1952 making provisions for old age security or death benefits; The 
Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 providing relief to women workers; The Contract Labour 
(Regulation & Abolition) Act, 1970 stipulating 9 hours work for them between 6 A.M. and 7 
P.M. only; The Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972; The Equal Remuneration Act, 1976 ensuring 
equal remuneration to men and women workers for similar work; The Inter-state Migrant 
Workmen (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1979. Taken together, 
these legislations ensure a dignified work environment, a certain minimum remuneration, and 
aims to prevent discrimination and exploitation in the labour market. 
Thus there have been a plethora of laws and acts in the post-independent India, mainly 
directed to protect the workers from the vagaries of employers. We have to look at what has 
been the practice under this maze of State interventions in the labour market. 
III. IMPLEMENTATION OF LABOUR POLICIES – THE PRACTICE 
While the labour laws have been commendable in their declared intentions to protect 
fundamental rights of workers, they are hardly implemented in any meaningful way for most 
workers in the country. Moreover, as the Second Labour Commission points out: 
“… our labour laws have not flowed from any vision of a harmonious and just social 
order that takes into account the needs of an efficient and non-exploitative society, or a 
vision of the rights, duties and responsibilities of the different social partners to 
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themselves, to each other, and to the totality of the community.” (Report of Second 
National Commission for Labour, Chapter 1, page 12.) 
They have been imposed from above and it has been presumed that it is solely the State’s 
responsibility to protect the workers’ interests. Consequently, development of labour market 
in India has been stifled and various institutions needed to ensure welfare of the workers have 
not come up. These laws are also alleged to be directed towards a meagre proportion of the 
working class in India – those in the organised sector. It is true that the laws were aimed 
mainly at the ‘industrial’ sector, but there were sufficient reasons for doing so in the early 
days of our planning. It had been assumed that a Lewis type economic transition will take 
place in India. If a large part of the workers were ultimately to be engaged in the modern 
sector, it was natural to ensure that a model working conditions and regulations were in place 
for this sector. However, such massive transformation did not take place and in 1999-2000, 
only 7 per cent of the workers were in the organised sector, and 2 per cent in the organised 
industries (Table 1). Assuming that all the laws for the organised sector are fully 
implemented (which they are not) the coverage of most of the pro-labour legislations are 
therefore very restricted. 
Table 1 
Employment (in millions) in the Organised and Unorganised Sector 
 Total Employment 
 
Industrial Employment 
 Growth Rate of 
Total 
Employment 
 Growth Rate of 
Industrial 
Employment 
 Organised Unorganised  Organised Unorganised  Org 
anised 
Unorga 
nised 
 Org 
anised 
Unorg 
anised 
1983-84 24.03 (7.9) 
278.93 
(92.1) 
 6.96 
(2.3) 
27.24 
(8.9) 
 
  
 
  
1987-88 25.71 (8.0) 
293.88 
(92.0) 
 7.15 
(2.2) 
30.05 
(9.4) 
 1.75 1.34  0.68 2.58 
1993-94 27.41 (7.3) 
349.64 
(92.7) 
 7.12 
(1.9) 
36.55 
(9.7) 
 1.10 3.16  -0.07 3.61 
1999-00 27.95 (7.0) 
369.01 
(93.0) 
 7.78 
(1.9) 
41.49 
(10.4) 
 0.33 0.92  1.54 2.25 
Note: Figures in parenthesis are percentages to total workers. Growth Rates are over previous time point. 
Source: Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Govt. of India, CSO (Various Years) 
The only recourse that the ‘left-out’ mass of workers in the unorganised sectors have is the 
Minimum Wages Act, 1948. But the practice in this regard too is poor. Minimum wage rates 
are revised very infrequently, in absence of indexation their real values erode in the 
intermediate years, and in some cases the revised rates are lower in real terms than the pre-
revision rates. Significantly, in most cases, such statutory minimum wages have not been 
sufficient to enable a regular worker to remain above the official poverty line. Even then, 
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enforcement has been poor and actual wages have mostly lagged behind statutory minimum 
wages. Only exception has been the agricultural sector where market wages have been higher 
than minimum wages and their long run growth have been quite substantial and uniform 
across the states. Since no perceptible difference in enforcement mechanism exists in this 
sector this can be attributed to substantial increase in agricultural productivity, and the 
organisation of agricultural workers (ILO-ARTEP, 1993). 
The only area where labour laws – both regarding job security and adequate income have 
been implemented with some fervour in India has been that of organised industries and the 
public sector. Wages here have been ‘fixed’ to ensure certain living standards, revisions to 
wages have been fairly regular, full indexation have been used in the intermediate periods, 
annual increments have been systematic, and bonus and other welfare payments have been 
consistent. It is however peculiar, that the recommendations of Central Pay Commissions, 
specifically appointed to fix salaries of central government employees, usually serve as 
reference points for the Wage Boards and the DPE, and then for state PSUs and private 
enterprises as well. Therefore, it is virtually impossible to consider factors like productivity 
growth, skill formation, profitability, etc. while revising wages. Money wage growth is thus 
ensured over time. As a result, per employee emoluments in the industrial sector has 
increased consistently both in monetary and real terms (Table 2). The rate of wage increase 
has been faster in the public industries compared to the private industries, and even greater in 
public services and administration. 
Table 2 
Growth of Wages in the Registered Factories 
 
Average Annual Growth Rate over the Previous Period (%) 
Year  Money Wages  Prices  Real Wages 
1970-1975  13.81  9.23  4.58 
1975-1980  12.78  6.14  6.64 
1980-1985  17.96  14.50  3.46 
1985-1990  15.35  9.53  5.82 
1990-1995  17.10  4.87  12.23 
1995-2000  11.66  15.52  -3.86 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, CSO, Govt. of India (Various Years) 
The prevalent labour policies have thus created and perpetuated Dualism in the Indian labour 
market. On one hand a small group of workers are immunised from retrenchment, obtain 
decent wages and other benefits, enjoy automatic annual increments and indexation, and for 
whom pay-revisions are regular and has no link with productivity. On the other hand, we 
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have a large mass of workers who do not have any job security, whose wages have lagged 
behind statutory minimum wages and are not adequate to keep them above poverty line. 
These later group also do not enjoy any additional benefit in most cases, indexation of their 
wages are absent, revisions of the legislations for them are irregular and infrequent. While the 
former group enjoy both employment security and income security, lack of job security for 
the latter group prevent them from organising themselves and demand even decent income 
security. This inequality has initiated and propagated certain scheme of reactions in the 
economy to which we turn in the subsequent section. 
IV. DUALISTIC LABOUR MARKET – IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY 
There have been certain unwarranted outcomes of the labour policies practiced in India. 
These impacts have been different across different segments of the economy. 
1. Public Sector 
The labour policies related to job security and income enhancement are more rigorously 
followed in the public sector – both industrial and services. The State, in its bid to behave like 
a model employer, have always looked at the external economies of sustaining a well paid 
industrial and administrative workforce, and not at the costs and external diseconomies.  
Table 3 
Growth of Employment in the Public Sector 
Year Employment (in millions)  Average Annual Growth Rate (%) over previous period 
 Total  Manufacturing  Total  Manufacturing 
1980-81 15.48  1.50     
1990-91 18.77  1.87  2.13  2.47 
1999-00 19.31  1.53  0.31  -1.85 
Source: Monthly Abstract of Statistics, Govt. of India, CSO (Various Years) 
Since government jobs are best paid (ratio of public sector wage to private sector wage has 
varied between 1.25 to 1.75 over the 1970-2000 period, increasing consistently) and there are 
practically no efforts to even measure productivity, supply of labour to this sector has been 
infinite, and efficiency low. This has resulted in accumulation of surplus labour in the PSUs 
and the government services without proportional rise in output and income (estimated to be 
about 16 per cent of total workforce in 2001). Since these workers also enjoy substantial 
wage-increases periodically irrespective of profitability of the enterprises, the financial 
burden on the State in terms of wage payments and other benefits multiplied manifold over 
the years till they became unsustainable. Units became sick and fiscal prudence asked for 
closure of units and rationalisation of workforce. This has resulted in slackening growth of 
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employment even in the Public sector in recent times (Table 3). On the other hand such a 
huge fiscal burden prevented the State to take up programmes which could have generated 
employment in the unorganised, especially the rural sector. A major cause of declining rural 
employment in the nineties has been attributed to declining public expenditure in the rural 
areas and dwindling infrastructure (Mukherjee, 2003). 
2. Organised Private Sector 
The labour policies have been applicable to the organised private sector as well, especially 
for the factories. However, as rational employers, they have faced the laws as restrictions 
imposed on their decision making process and have attempted to maximise their returns 
nevertheless. Firstly, rules regarding closure of enterprises entail substantial compensation for 
retrenchment.  Secondly, temporary or casual labour is used cautiously as after a specified 
time of employment they would be deemed to be permanent and entitled to higher benefits.  
Thirdly, wage legislations have raised the cost of hiring workers – both current wages and 
present value of future benefits that are to be offered to the workers in cash and kind. Such 
wage legislations are also practically exogenous in nature – pay revisions for government 
employees take place at regular intervals; this leads to wage revisions in PSUs; there is a 
demand for wage revision in private sector as well and real wages are revised upwards. Thus 
the employers face a peculiar dilemma – once they hire someone they cannot fire her; the 
costs of retaining is substantial and ever increasing, having no link with productivity and 
profitability; the cost of retrenchment (if permitted) is exorbitantly high. All these push cost 
of labour far above the prevalent wage level and makes labour relatively dearer compared to 
capital, or at least the relative price of labour compared to capital goes on increasing. 
Table 4 
Terms of Trade between Capital and Labour and Capital-Labour Ratio in Registered Factories 
Year Terms of Trade  Capital-Labour Ratio 
 
Level Index  Level Index 
1980-81 0.90 100  0.37 100 
1985-86 1.34 148  0.63 170 
1990-91 1.04 116  0.81 219 
1995-96 1.30 145  1.19 320 
2000-01 1.37 152  1.44 387 
Note:
 Terms of Trade between Capital and Labour is calculated as the ratio between 
Emolument per Worker and Interest per unit of Outstanding Loan; Capital-Labour 
Ratio is measured as Fixed Capital per Employee in Rs. Lakh in constant 1980-81 
prices. 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, CSO, Govt. of India (Various Years) 
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This has surely happened in India where, in the registered factories, labour cost (measured by 
per employee emoluments and benefits) relative to capital cost (measured by interest payment 
per unit of borrowed capital) has been increasing throughout (Table 4). Such rise has also 
been faster than the rise in profitability (measured by profit per unit of invested capital) 
(Table 5). That productivity (measured by Gross Value Added per employee) has increased 
faster than emoluments is of little consolation as this has followed substitution of labour by 
capital by employers in response to exogenous changes in wages to enhance labour 
productivity. This is corroborated from Table 4 where we find that capital-labour ratio has 
almost quadrupled during 1980-2000. Such steps, however, adversely affect the prospects of  
Table 5 
Movements of Factor Returns in Registered Factories (Base 1980-81 = 100) 
Year GVA per Employee  
Emolument 
per 
Employee 
 
Profit per unit 
Invested 
Capital 
 
Interest per unit 
Outstanding 
Loan 
1980-81 100  100  100  100 
1985-86 169  155  103  104 
1990-91 218  174  126  150 
1995-96 323  222  194  153 
2000-01 373  261  135  172 
Source: Annual Survey of Industries, CSO, Govt. of India (Various Years) 
employment increase in the medium to long run. In the initial years any rise in costs due to 
rise in wages (and other factors too) were tacitly passed on to the consumers. In a closed 
economy framework this suited the employers, the employees and the State. But in the new 
global economy framework, such mechanisms are suicidal. Domestic enterprises have to 
compete with MNCs both for international and domestic markets and so price and cost 
competitiveness is of utmost importance to employers. This has prompted them to search for 
escape routes, especially since mid 1980s when the Industrial Disputes Act with new 
restrictions was put into place and soft liberalisation took away the protective shield from 
domestic industry. One of them, the substitution of labour by capital, has already been 
mentioned. Other avenues taken up by innovative entrepreneurs include entering into 
‘contracts for services’ with individuals, middlemen and agencies for labour supply; engaging 
workers for specific time-determined piece-meal contracts; inducing workers to form 
cooperatives and submit bills for work done instead of drawing wages; classifying workers as 
apprentices or trainees and specifying that employment is not offered; changing record of 
names several times a year; hiring casual workers; designating workers as consultants who 
submit periodical bills; etc. Another method taken up by employers has been to set up 
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number of independent small units instead of one large unit. Though this method prevents 
realization of economies of scale, the resultant losses are outweighed by the combined 
advantages of labour flexibility and the saving on labour costs. 
 
3. Unorganised sector 
The fallout of the slackening employment growth in the public sector and the private 
organised sector is a tremendous growth of employment in the unorganised sector in India, 
growth rates in the latter being almost three times that of the former during the 1987-93 and 
1993-99 periods (Table 1). As a result, while its share in total employment had been above 90 
per cent even in 1983-84, it has been increasing throughout the last two decades, except a 
marginal fall during 1983-87. For the industrial sector, the share has been increasing since 
1983-84 itself. This is quite natural as the employers seeking escape from the laws pertaining 
to the organised sector are increasingly resorting to ancillarisation and sub-contracting. In 
addition, workers not finding entry into the organised sector are resorting to self-employment 
and setting up small units as means of livelihood. While a part of the unorganised sector are 
growing in tandem with the organised sector through the linkages of sub-contracting and 
supplying of semi-finished inputs, a major part of them are distress units. It is observed that at 
least for the unorganised manufacturing sector (UMS) such a dual force is clearly operative 
with the comparatively larger units (the DMEs) growing along with the factories in the urban 
areas and along with agricultural development in the rural areas.1 On the other hand, the 
smaller units (OAMES and NDMEs) are growing in spaces of relative economic hardship 
(slackening growth of factories and agricultural sector, high poverty, low per capita income, 
etc.). However, as the DMEs are lesser in number and worker base (in 2000, DMEs constitute 
only 4 per cent of the units and 17 per cent of the workers in UMS), and their characteristics 
are more like the organised sector, it would be justified to infer that much of the 37 million 
workers in UMS are in distress and have taken up the profession to fend away complete 
unemployment. It is also to be noted that a major part of these workers are unpaid household 
workers (in 2000, more than 75 per cent of workers in UMS were household labour) and the 
share of part time workers in this sector have increased from 10 per cent in 1989-90 to over 
18 per cent in 1999-2000. For the hired workers, the story has not been very different. 
Emoluments per hired worker in the UMS in real terms (1989-90 prices) have increased from 
Rs. 3029 in 1989-90 to Rs. 4193 in 1999-2000, averaging a growth of around 3.6 per cent p.a. 
Compared to about 7.3 per cent p.a. rise in per employee emoluments in the factory sector 
over the same period, it is quite clear that the workers in the unorganised sector are getting a 
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raw deal. On one hand, they are practically not covered by any job-security legislation. On 
the other, the only legislation that they can resort to, that of income security, is not effective. 
V. EFFECT ON EMPLOYMENT – A COMPREHENSIVE VIEW 
It is thus evident that stringent labour laws have provided strong incentives to present and 
prospective employers, especially those in the organised sector, to minimise hiring of regular 
workers. The public sector has already passed the threshold limit of its carrying capacity as 
far as providing jobs is concerned and is desperately trying to shed flab through various early 
separation schemes. This has had serious impact on employment growth in the economy and 
also on the nature and quality of jobs that are available. 
 
Figure 1 
 
Panel A Panel B 
1. An Analytical Model 
Analytically, the dual labour market policies are expected to trigger off the following 
mechanism in the labour market.2 As evident, there are two segments of the labour market – 
the Organised sector where workers are protected (both in terms of secure jobs and adequate 
income), and the Unorganised sector where there are practically no coverage. Let the two 
markets be represented in Panel A and Panel B respectively of Figure 1. AB and CD are the 
labour demand and labour supply curves in the organised sector. Market clearing wage rate is 
Wo and employment is OEo. However, due to various legislations and pro-worker policies, 
the effective minimum wage rate is Wm1. It is quite natural that in a labour surplus developing 
economy Wm has to be substantially higher than Wo. The gap WoWm1 is the premium enjoyed 
by workers in the organised sector. Facing this wage rate, employers employ only OEm1 
amount of labour. There is thus loss of employment of the magnitude EoEm1, which we may 
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call notional displaced workers due to labour legislations. Output also reduces by EoabEm1 
amount. If we consider the unorganised sector as the balancing sector where all those seeking 
but not finding jobs in the organised sector are absorbed, then the labour supply curve would 
be almost vertical, as depicted by C2D2 in Panel B. In absence of any protection, wage rate in 
this sector is determined by market forces. Expectedly, this wage Wu1 would be lower than 
Wo. After implementation of legislations in the organised sector, the notionally displaced 
workers enter the unorganised labour market, expanding labour supply to C3D3. As a result, 
employment in the unorganised sector increases from OEu1 to OEu2 but wages decrease to 
Wu2. 
Thus employment increases by Eu1Eu2 and output increases by Eu1mnEu2. The incremental 
employment and output are however lower than the loss in employment and output in the 
organised sector as EoEm1 > Eu1Eu2, and Wm > Wo > Wu1 > Wu2. The result is therefore a net 
loss in employment and output, and a further decline in the already low wages in the 
unorganised sector leading to inequality. Empirical evidence in the Indian context tends to 
support this mechanism. Sometimes, employers react to the increase in wages and decline in 
output by upgrading technology. This leads to improvement in value of marginal productivity 
of labour and rise in labour demand to A1B1. This reduces the impact of declining 
employment and output to some extent, but the adverse impact on wages in the unorganised 
sector would still remain. Let us now see what has actually happened in India in recent times. 
While the phenomenon of low and depressing wages in the unorganised sector has already 
been mentioned, let us examine the effect on employment scenario. 
2. Employment Growth 
The absolute level of employment growth has decelerated in recent times, especially in the 
post-1990 period. Both Usual and Current status employment rates have decreased during 
1993-99 leading to a rise in open unemployment rates (Table 6). The only exception to this 
broad trend is the urban female group, where the employment rates have increased in the 
post-reform period. However, this is not a sign of enthusiasm as it is observed to be caused 
by a decline in usual employment and a more than proportional decline in size of workforce. 
It is generally accepted that when work is not available even after a long wait, a substantial 
proportion of females withdraw themselves from the labour force rather than report as 
unemployed. The post reform increase in current employment rate for urban female is due to 
an increase in workforce along with a more than proportional increase in employment. The 
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virtue of this phenomenon too has been questioned on grounds of increased availability and 
employment of females in irregular and low paid jobs especially in the service sector. 
Table 6 
Work Participation, Employment and Unemployment Trends in India 
 Usual Employment Rates  Usual Unemployment Rates 
Number of persons employed/unemployed per 1000 workforce 
 Rural Urban Total  Rural Urban Total 
 M F T M F T   M F T M F T  
1983 97.9 98.6 98.1 94.1 93.2 93.9 97.3  2.1 1.4 1.9 5.9 6.9 6.1 2.7 
1987 98.2 97.6 98.0 94.8 93.8 94.6 97.2  1.8 2.4 2.0 5.2 6.2 5.4 2.8 
1993 98.6 99.4 98.9 95.9 93.9 95.6 98.1  1.4 0.6 1.1 4.1 6.1 4.4 1.9 
1999 98.3 99.0 98.6 95.6 94.6 95.2 97.8  1.7 1.0 1.5 4.5 5.7 4.7 2.3 
   
 Current Daily Employment Rates Current Daily Unemployment Rates 
Number of persons employed/unemployed per 1000 workforce 
 Rural Urban Total  Rural Urban Total 
 M F T M F T   M F T M F T  
1983 92.5 90.8 92.0 90.8 89.8 90.6 91.7  7.5 9.0 7.9 9.2 10.5 9.4 8.3 
1987 95.4 93.2 94.8 91.2 88.0 90.6 93.8  4.6 6.7 5.2 8.8 12.0 9.4 6.2 
1993 96.8 96.6 96.9 93.2 89.4 92.4 95.7  3.2 3.4 3.1 6.8 10.6 7.6 4.3 
1999 92.8 92.7 93.0 92.8 90.2 92.2 92.8  7.2 7.0 7.1 7.3 9.4 7.7 7.3 
Source: Author’s Calculations based on NSSO (1983, 1990, 1992, 1994, 2001).  
Such deteriorating employment scenario is the main outcome of the sluggishness of 
employers to take in more labour. This phenomenon of jobless growth will be more evident if 
we look at the elasticity of employment with respect to output in the economy (Table 7). In 
all the major sectors of the economy this elasticity has consistently declined, with negative 
elasticity experienced in the Mining and Electricity-Gas-Water Supply sectors during 1993-
99 period. If we consider the 2001-02 thin sample survey of NSSO, then the elasticities are 
negative in the Primary and Tertiary sectors during 1999-2001 period. Though too much 
should not be read from thin samples, yet the unsatisfactory performance of the services 
sector, hailed as the engine of employment creation in the new era, invites serious concern 
and asks for deeper exploration. At the sub-national level, such decline in elasticity levels are 
evident in all the major states except Delhi, Gujarat, Kerala, Madhya Pradesh, and Punjab. 
Table 7 
Elasticity of Employment with respect to Output Growth by Sectors 
Sector 1983-87  1987-93  1993-99 
Agriculture 0.20  0.34  0.14 
Mining & Quarrying 1.17  0.43  -0.44 
Manufacturing 0.31  0.30  0.16 
Elec, Gas & Water 0.60  0.31  -0.10 
Construction -0.61  2.39  0.96 
Services 0.87  0.39  0.23 
 
     
Total 0.35  0.33  0.18 
Source: Same as Table 6, and Estimates of State 
Domestic Product, Govt. of India, CSO 
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3. Quality of Work 
The impact has not been restricted to loss of jobs only. Even the jobs that have escaped the 
axe have become less regular and less secure. There is a marked trend towards casualisation 
of the workforce both at the usual principal and the usual principal and subsidiary status 
(Table 8). Proportion of casual workers among all workers have increased in all segments 
during 1979-99 period except for urban females in 1993-99. That this may have been caused 
by withdrawal of females from the workforce has already been indicated. 
Table 8 
Distribution of Usually Employed by Category of Employment 
Usual Principal Status  Usual Principal & Subsidiary Status 
Per 1000 Workers  Per 1000 Workers Sector Year 
Self 
Employed 
Regular 
Employee 
Casual 
Employee 
 Self 
Employed 
Regular 
Employee 
Casual 
Employee 
1978-1979 622 108 270 
  
628 106 266 
1983-1984 595 106 299 
 
605 103 292 
1987-1988 575 104 321 
 
586 100 314 
1993-1994 569 85 346 
 
579 83 338 
Rural Male 
1999-2000 544 90 366   550 88  362 
 
        
1978-1979 563 37 400 
 
621 28 351 
1983-1984 541 37 422 
 
619 28 353 
1987-1988 549 49 402 
 
608 37 355 
1993-1994 513 34 453 
 
585 28 387 
Rural Female 
1999-2000 
 500 39  461    573  31  396 
 
        
1978-1979 399 472 189 
 
404 464 132 
1983-1984 402 445 153 
 
409 437 154 
1987-1988 410 444 146 
 
417 437 146 
1993-1994 411 427 162 
 
417 421 162 
Urban Male 
1999-2000 
 412  419  169    415  417  168 
 
        
1978-1979 422 308 270 
 
495 249 256 
1983-1984 373 318 309 
 
458 258 284 
1987-1988 393 342 265 
 
471 275 254 
1993-1994 364 355 281 
 
454 286 258 
Urban Female 
1999-2000 
 384  385  231    453  333  214 
Source: NSSO (2001) 
 
Apart from casualisation of usual workers, lack of regular employment (Underemployment or 
Semi-open unemployment - SOU) itself has to be highlighted.3 The difference between 
Current Daily Status Unemployment and Usual Status Unemployment would give us a 
measure of underemployment or SOU – people who are usually employed but not currently 
employed. It is observed that the nineties have witnessed rising magnitude of SOU after a 
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consistent decline of it in the earlier decade (Table 9). SOU is more severe for the female 
workers, the proportion being almost 4-5 times of the corresponding male figures in both 
rural and urban areas. 
Thus, in the face of stringent labour laws, wage-gap between the organised and unorganised 
sector has been increasing, while the share of organised sector itself is decreasing. In 
addition, both open unemployment and underemployment are increasing, widening further 
the gap between the small mass of protected labour and the remaining millions of vulnerable 
workers and job-seekers. Decreasing elasticities of employment also paint a pessimistic 
picture of the labour market in the medium run. How to face this situation is studied in the 
next section. 
VI. ISSUES AND OPTIONS 
The objectives of State intervention in labour market have not been fulfilled in India. It has 
often been argued that such interventions have achieved ‘employment at the cost of 
employability’. Legislations based on job type and working conditions criteria have 
institutionalised, propagated, consolidated and perpetuated dualism in the labour market. The 
assumption that slowly more and more workers will enter the formal sector where the model 
legislations are operative has not come true. On the contrary, employment have increased in 
the form of informal jobs where employers are not encumbered by rules related to security of 
jobs and minimum wages and therefore can exploit the workers. The very intention of 
providing protection to the working class has created a small enclave of ‘protected’ labourers 
leaving out the teeming millions to fend for themselves in the market. This has gone against 
our proclaimed principle of social equity leading to persistence poverty and economic 
inequality. To meaningfully provide solutions to this peculiar paradox, we must summarise 
the issues and options before us carefully. 
Table 9 
Underemployment Trends in India 
 Number of persons per 1000 workforce 
 Rural Urban 
 M F T M F T Total 
1983 11.6 41.2 22.6 7.2 27.8 11.5 20.4 
1987 8.7 44.1 21.6 6.8 32.6 12.3 19.6 
1993 6.4 31.5 15.4 4.6 22.4 8.3 13.6 
1999 9.8 31.6 17.3 5.2 19.0 7.9 15.0 
Source: Same as Table 6 
It is argued that in light of our experience and in the context of globalisation, labour market 
reforms are necessary for stimulating long-term growth of output and employment in the 
Indian economy. The attack has mainly been focused against the regulations restricting 
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retrenchment and closure i.e. those that impede employment flexibility. While it is true that 
restrictions to flexibility have prevented unemployment during downturns, it has also 
dampened employers’ incentive to expand employment during upswings. These regulations 
have obstructed expansion of flourishing sectors, prevented restructuring of dying sectors, 
and hence constrained growth in both output and employment. Also, high actual labour costs 
act as a restraint to foreign investment and confines it to capital-intensive sectors. In the face 
of growing external competition, the clamour for restructuring has gained momentum. It is 
argued that if introduced, the right to hire and fire will enable employers to compete with 
MNCs enjoying flexible conditions and help them to actually prosper, lifting employment 
figures upwards. 
However, this proposition cannot be welcomed without blinking. Employment flexibility can 
be introduced only when appropriate labour market institutions are in place. Hiring and firing 
itself leads to substantial social and personal loss unless retrenched workers are able to find 
suitable jobs. This requires upgradation of their employability quotient through training and 
rehabilitation programmes. This calls for sufficient labour market information available to the 
workers, training centres imparting useful and in-demand skills, and providing means of 
sustenance in the intermediate period between jobs. In absence of such provisions, taking 
away job security from the workers will only create a sense of despair and despondency 
among them. Our experience with labour redundancy in the public sector and National 
Renewal Fund (NRF) seems to corroborate this thinking. Only the Voluntary Retirement 
Scheme (VRS) programme under the NRF has made any progress while those related to 
counselling, retraining and redeployment hardly has advanced anywhere. Most of the workers 
who have taken VR have deposited their capital in Post Offices and Banks and are living on 
interest income. Though some workers, mostly from managerial cadre, have gone into the 
private sector, very few workers have taken up new assignments. Even if they were to enter 
the job market, they would most probably have gone into the unorganised sector, worsening 
the conditions of those already employed therein. One way out of this mess can be linking of 
retrenchment and closure permissions with the ‘Area Regeneration Programmes’. 
Entrepreneurs desirous of winding up an unit would be permitted only if the capital released 
is used for setting up of unit(s) of similar employment potential in the same area – albeit of a 
sunrise sector. This will enable employers to restructure without job loss. Workers would 
have to be paid Allowances in the intermediate period and retrained to be employable in the 
new venture. A major part of this cost would have to be borne by the State no doubt. Another 
way to prevent labour being relatively dearer would be to link wages with productivity and 
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severe the link between pay rise in government administrative sector and those in production 
sectors. 
One may argue that what happens to this protected minuscule part of our workforce is of little 
importance. That however is not the situation. Giving carte blanche to formal employers to 
retrench and close down will have its impact on the unorganised sector too. Once job security 
in the organised sector is withdrawn, vulnerability of workers in that sector would increase. 
They would no longer be able to organise themselves and collectively bargain for 
preservation of their income security. Once that happens, demonstration effect will create 
immense pressure on unorganised workers and make their task of being organised and press 
for better working conditions more difficult. 
In this light the recommendations put forward by the Second Labour Commission has to be 
evaluated. It seems that the commission has proposed a relaxation of retrenchment and 
closure restrictions along with linking of wages with productivity for the organised sector. On 
the other hand, a host of social security and minimum wage policies have been proposed for 
the unorganised sector. While the intentions of the commission are commendable, there are 
certain issues that need to be sorted out. It is not the fact that there have been no income 
security or pro-worker legislation covering the unorganised sector. The problem is that the 
sheer size of the sector has made implementation a monumental task. A major part of the 
sector is hidden through unpaid and unaccounted household labour and being unorganised 
they lack political clout to form pressure groups for execution of relevant laws. Even with all 
the good intentions such an umbrella protection will need huge fiscal commitment from the 
State, which is hard to materialise under present economic dispensation. Therefore, passing 
laws to protect unorganised workers will hardly work and only the easier recommendations 
like relaxation of rules for the organised sector will get implemented in the immediate run. 
This will be much like putting the cart before the horse and will create further distortions in 
the labour market. While balancing the two segments and breaking the dualistic character is 
important, one should be careful to avoid deteriorating conditions in both the sectors in the 
name of uniformity. 
Under such situation one may consider few other options as well. While in principle 
flexibility in the labour market is welcome, they should be implemented in a careful and 
phased manner. Apart from linking closure with regeneration as already mentioned, one may 
also look at possibilities of allowing employers to transfer workers between units and 
departments, even across regional and national boundaries. This will make the employers 
responsible for skill upgradation of the workers and allow them to pursue flexible 
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specialisation too.4 Such restricted flexibility in the short run will have to be followed by 
adequate institution building in the medium run. However, such institutions are to be built up 
not through State legislations solely. A major reason of the present disorder is that the present 
legislations have been imposed from above and not followed through labour organisations 
and labour struggles. So, the policies and legislations should emerge from consultations 
among, discussions with, and active participation of the workers themselves. The relatively 
better position of agricultural workers, especially in West Bengal and Kerala, bear testimony 
to the necessity of organising the unorganised workers before passing laws for them. Efforts 
made in this direction by VV Giri National Labour Institute in Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, 
Tamil Nadu, and Uttar Pradesh have also borne fruits (NLI, 2000). Institutions that require 
State sponsorship and guidance are those that would impart retraining and assistance in job 
search. The institutions conceived under the NRF are Employee Resource Centres, Employee 
Assistance Centres, and Area Regeneration Councils. These should not be restricted to 
retrenched workers only, but should be extended to all workers presently positioned or 
intending to join unorganised sector. Also, the programmes must be directed more towards 
self-employment rather than wage employment. Additional support to these workers in form 
of smooth and cheap credit, scientific and technical consultancy, incentive to form 
cooperatives, preference in purchase of materials would also go a long way in improving the 
conditions of unorganised workers. Ideal situation would see an integrated network of 
institutions, managed jointly by the government, trade unions and employers’ organizations 
functioning in a mutually interactive and supportive manner. In addition, it must be noted that 
investment, employment creation and growth are significantly affected by infrastructural 
availability, credit flow, and human resource embedded in the workers, along with labour 
costs. Improving the endowment of those other factors would also help in creating a more 
job-friendly environment. The State should understand that reforming labour legislations in a 
piecemeal manner would only deteriorate the already vulnerable position of workers 
countrywide. 
                                                 
Notes 
1
 This has been explored extensively by Mukherjee (2004). 
2
 This has been adopted from Brown et al (1982) 
3
 The concept was first discussed loosely by Joan Robinson (1960), and then by Gautam Mathur 
(1999). Pioneering work in these two issues was by Mathur (1999) who concentrated at the national 
level. Mukherjee (2003) has explored these issues in detail. 
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4
 Such delinking of job permanency from income security has also been advocated by ILO-ARTEP 
(1993). 
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